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This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of the Nixon wage—price controls on
the price level. The major new wrinkle is that the controls are treated as a quantitative (rather
than just a qualitative) phenomenon through the use of a specially-constructed series indicating
the fraction of the economy that was controlled. According to the estimates, by February 1974
controls had lowered the non-food non-energy price level by 3—4 percent. After that point, and
especially after controls ended in April 1974, a period of rapid 'catch up' inflation eroded the
gains that had been achieved, leaving the price level from zero to 2 percent below what it would
have been in the absence of controls. The dismantling of controls can thus account for most the
the burst of 'double digit' inflation in non-food and non-energy prices during 1974.
1. Introduction
For better or for worse, controls over wages and prices have become a
standard component of the macroeconomic policymaker's arsenal. For this
reason, it is useful to examine with some care the only experience the United
States has ever had with mandatory wage—price controls in time of peace. By
how much did the controls program initiated by the Nixon administration in
August 1971 restrain inflation? How severe was the extra 'catch up' inflation
that occurred when controls were lifted? To what extent does the removal of
controls account for the remark-able burst of 'double digit' inflation that we
experienced in 1974? These are the questions addressed in this paper.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 are brief sections reviewing, respectively, what theory
suggests controls might do to the path of the price level, the major
institutional features of the 1971—1974 controls, and previous attempts to
measure the effects of these controls. Section 5, the heart of the paper,
describes our own model of the effects of controls and discusses the
estimates. Section 6 is a brief conclusion.
*The research reported here is part of the National Bureau of Economic Research's program
in economic fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the
NBER. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, as
are helpful comments from Robert J. Gordon, Martin Feldstein, and a referee.
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2. Controls and the price level
A useful benchmark for what we expect controls to do to the path of the
price level is provided by the standard supply-and-demand diagram, in which
temporary, binding controls lower prices in the short run, but result in excess
demand which drives prices back to their initial levels once controls are
lifted. The suggestion, once we aggregate to the macro level, is that controls
might influence the price level in the manner indicated in fig. 1.
Fig. 1
Unless the controls are an exercise in futility, we certainly expect them to
reduce the rate of inflationat least as measured in the official indexes1
while they are in effect. How much, of course, is an empirical question. What
should happen after controls are lifted is much more controversial. While
simplistic use of the micro analogy suggests precisely 100% catchup, as in fig.
1, arguments can be made why the catch up might be either greater or less
than 100%.
Proponentsof controls point out that a controls program will also hold
down marginal costs as well as product prices so that, when controls are
lifted, there may not be any excess demand at the controlled price. In the
11f controls cause shortages which are partially alleviated by disguised price hikes (e.g., quality
deterioration, ending previously-offered discounts, queueing, etc.), official price indices may
understate the inflation in the 'shadow prices' [see Oi (1976)] or in a more accurate index of
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particular case of the 1971—1974 controls, the weight of empirical evidence,
however, seems to be that controls squeezed profit margins, that is, were
more effective on prices than on wages.2 In such a case, marginal costs
would not have been held down by as much as prices, so some catch up
would be expected.3
Furthermore, it is virtually certain that any real-world controls program
will distort relative prices, and it is abundantly clear that the 197 1—1974
controls did so. To the extent that prices are rigid downward, equilibrium
relative prices can only be re-established through rising nominal prices.
A different argument for complete catch up is based on the long-run
neutrality of money. If the controls program does not imply a change in the
long-run path of the money supply (or of fiscal policy), it cannot affect the
long-run price level because (a) there is no mechanism by which temporary
controls can permanently affect velocity, and (b) the natural rate hypothesis
implies that real output will be at its 'full-employment' level in the long run
regardless of whether or not there ever was a controls program. Supporters
of controls counter that the money supply path need not be fixed.
Specifically, by permitting the price level path to be deflected downward for
a while, controls allow the economy to get by with less money. If the money
supply path is permanently lowered, then the price level path should also be
permanently lowered, in contradiction to fig. 1. In fact, however, there is no
evidence that monetary growth was throttled back after August 1971.
In the arguments reviewed so far, potential GNP was assumed to be
unaffected by controls. But this might not be so. It has been alleged (though
not, to our knowledge, demonstrated empirically) that the controls
discouraged business investment. The common belief that the 1971—1974
controls program squeezed profit margins by holding down prices more than
wages has been used to support this allegation. If true, this is a reason why
the catch up could conceivably exceed 100 percent, for in that case controls
would have reduced the natural rate of real output.
Finally, the most important intellectual justification for instituting controls
in the first place may also provide a reason not to expect much catch up
behavior when they are lifted. To the extent that inflation perpetuates itself
through self-fulfilling inflationary expectations, and to the extent that the
shock-treatment of controls succeeds in reducing inflationary expectations,
temporary controls could conceivably have a permanent effect on the price
level, even with no change in demand management policies. Whether
inflationary expectations actually did decline in August 1971, and how
2forexample, Schult.ze (1975) or Gordon (1973). Other authors have reached the same
conclusion.
3Raw materials prices also enter marginal costs, and were never controlled (nor could they
have been). However, at least in principle, cost increases for these reasons could have been
entirely passed through to prices (except during freezes), and thus should not have led to any
catch up behavior, except possibly to restore historic margins.4 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
durablethis decline proved to be, are hard to know. The well-known
Livingston data on inflationary expectations did show a drop of almost 1
percentage point between June 1971 and December 1971, and it seems
natural to attribute this to the controls.4 But the effects of dismantling the
controls are impossible to untangle from the Livingston data since decontrol
was gradual and since so many other 'shocks' were buffeting inflationary
expectations in 1973—1974.
On balance, both the a priori theoretical arguments and what we know
about how the 197 1—1974 controls actually operated seem to point strongly
to a post-controls catch up period, though the degree of catch up could be
either more or less than the 100 percent catch up depicted in fig. 1.
Estimation of the magnitude of the post-controls catch up is one major
objective of this paper.
3. The 1971—1974 controls program5
The New Economic Policy of August 1971 began with a 90-day freeze on
all wages, prices, and rents, with the exception of taxes, raw agricultural
products, and mortgage interest. This was followed by Phase II (November
1971 to December 1972), which set broad standards for permissible wage and
price increases and relied on self-administered compliance with regulations
issued by the Cost of Living Council (COLC). One notable feature of these
regulations was that one-for-one percentage pass-through of cost increases to
prices was permitted, subject to some profit margin limitations. The Pay
Board permitted increases of 5.5 percent in wages, with an extra allowance
for certain fringes, and permitted slightly larger increases for workers with
relatively small previous increases.
Phase III, which began in January 1973, was intended to be a transitional
period providing gradual deregulation. The profit margin constraint for cost-
justified price increases of less than 1.5 percent was removed, and larger than
standard price increases that were 'necessary for efficient allocation of
resources or to maintain adequate levels of supply' became permissible.6
Events of early 1973 quickly made Phase III look like a failure as increased
food prices and cost-justified price increases in other sectors led to a sharp
acceleration of inflation. Indeed, critics of the controls program might argue
that this was the beginning of the inevitable post-controls catch up inflation.
As a result of the acceleration of inflation, a second freeze on prices was
imposed from June to August 1973.
Phase IV, following the end of Freeze II, brought with it regulations even
more stringent than those of Phase II. For example, cost-justified price
4The series cited was created from Livingston's data by Carlson (1977).
5For a good detailed discussion of the controls apparatus, see Kosters (1975).
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increases were permitted only on a dollar-for-dollar basis rather than a
percentage markup basis, which squeezed historicprofit margins.
Furthermore, the policy of sector-by-sector decontrol was applied in a
manner which prevented needed relative price adjustments in several sectors,
including steel, petroleum, health, and food.7 As a result of sector by sector
decontrol, only about 12 percent of the CPI remained under control when
the controls expired on April 30, 1974.
It is apparent from the history of the controls program that any attempt
to model controls successfully must account for the changing character of the
program over the 1971—1974 period. The controls were not either 'on' or
'off'. Rather, the stringency of regulation in the controlled sector and,
especially, the size of the controlled sector varied over time. Furthermore,
circumstantial evidence from Phase III suggests the importance of separating
catch up inflation in the uncontrolledsectorfrom the effects of controls on
inflation in the controlledsector.Our model reflects these characteristics of
the controls program, at least in a crude way.
4. Estimating the impact of controls
To estimate the effects of controls on the price level, an equation or set of
equations is required that will generate two price-level paths: one with
controls [j3(t)] and the other without [i5(t)].Twoprinciple techniques have
been used to generate the two series needed for this calculation. The first
method uses dummyvariablesin a single equation that is estimated over a
period including the controls. j3(t) is generated by the equation with the
controls dummy 'on', and (t) is generated by the same equation with the
dummy 'off'. The procedure was criticized on a number of grounds by
Lipsey and Parkin (1970) and later by Oi (1976). The major difficulties are:
(a) the method is predicated on the assumption that the controls program
does not change any of the parameters of the model (except the
constant),
(b) any unusual event that happened during the controls period, but is not
captured elsewhere in the equation, will be blamed on the controls.
These problems have led most recent investigators of the question to use
post-sample predictions instead. In this method, the model is estimated only
on pre-controls data, and genuine post-sample predictions constitute the
series j5(t). i3(t) is identified with the actual price level path; so the prediction
errors become the estimated effects of controls. While this method avoids
problem (a) above, it seems to aggravate problem (b) since it implies
7See Kosters (1975, p. 25).6 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
that, were it not for controls, the model would have fit perfectly in every
quarter of the controls period.
We therefore advocate, and utilize in this paper, a third methodthat of
within-sample predictions. An empirical wage—price model, which allows
controls to alter several parameters, is estimated right through the controls
period. Then the model is used to generate both the j(t) and j5(t) paths. This
technique seems to obviate the difficulties with dummy variables, and allows
the equation to have residuals for reasons other than controls. Though it is
analogous to the standard procedure by which large-scale econometric
models are used to estimate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy, it seems
not to have been used heretofore to address the issue of controls.
Robert Gordon's work on controls is probably the best, and also the best
known. When Gordon (1975) generated post-sample predictions from a
structural price equation explaining the rate of change of a specially-
constructed deflator for non-food non-energy final sales, he estimated that
controls kept the 1973 :3 price level about 3- percent below what it otherwise
would have been. Then prices started to rise faster than they would have in a
world without controls, ultimately leaving the price level in 1975: 1 1 percent
above the no-controls path. Two quarters later, the equation was almost
precisely on track. However, when he re-estimated the equation with revised
data [Gordon (1977)], this picture changed dramatically. Post-sample
predictions from the revised equation suggested a downward deflection of the
price level of about 2.4 percent by 1972:4, not too different from his 1975
estimate. But then the equation started underpredicting inflation, and by
1975:1 it was underpredicting the price level by about 3.7 percent. The
difference [3.7—(—2.4)=6.1 percent] can hardly be attributed to a post-
controls catch up. When Gordon abandoned the post-sample predictions
method and used dummy variables instead, his estimate was that controls
lowered the price level by 2 percent from 1971:3 to 1972:4, and the post-
controls catch up gave this all back between 1974:2 and 1975 :1.
McGuire (1976) also used a structural model to make post-sample
predictions, but both his specification and his conclusion differed markedly
from Gordon's. When he used the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to measure
inflation, he found that controls lowered the inflation rate slightly in 1971 :4
through 1972:4, with the maximum effect on the price level (about 1.5
percent) coming in 1972:2. Thereafter, controls actually raised the inflation
rate, and by 1974 :2 the price level was about 3.5 percent higher than it
would have been without controls. These results are surprising, but some of
them must be due to the extraordinary behavior of food and fuel prices,
which, in our view, ought not to be blamed on controls. (However, McGuire
obtained similar results with the non-farm GNP deflator.)
Moreover, McGuire's equation badly underestimates inflation in 1971 :1
through 1971 :3. Since we look for an effect of controls by looking forAS. Blinder andWi. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 7
overpredictions starting in 1971 :4, this hardly inspires confidence in the
results. If we were to add the average prediction error of these three quarters
to all the forecasts, we would conclude that controls lowered inflation in the
non-farm GNP deflator in every quarter from 1971 :4 through 1973:3, with a
cumulative effect on the price level of 2.5 percent. Thereafter, controls raised
inflation so that the 1974:2 price level was only 1.2 percent below what it
would have been without controls. This certainly changes the picture
drastically, and is consistent with Gordon's estimates —evenwithout
making any adjustment for energy.
An earlier study by Lanzillotti, Hamilton and Roberts (1975) used three
conventional wage—price models to estimate the effects of Phases I and II. All
models used the private non-farm deflator to measure inflation. When the
models were estimated through 1971 :2 and used to generate post-sample
predictions for 1971 :3—1972:4, they yielded estimates of the downward
deflection of the annual inflation rate averaging 3.6 percent, 1.9percent, and
0.2 percent. Closer agreement was reached when the models were estimated
through 1972:4 and controls appraised by a dummy variable. Estimated
downward deflections of the annual inflation rate became 2.0percent, 1.6
percent, and 1.3 percent. It is interesting that the two methods give such
different results in this case.
Other, less conventional, methods have also been used to appraise the
Nixon controls —withdisparate results.8 This issue seems unresolved
empirically.
5. A new quantitative model of controls
In commenting on Gordon's estimate of the effects of controls, Nordhaus
(1975, p. 665) despaired that '.. . themethodology that Gordon and others
use to test for incomes policies is inadequate. Can't economists be more
creative than to use dummy variables? Why can't we model price controls
and test the model explicitly?' This section reports on anattempt to do
precisely this, though the creativity involved is perhaps not very great.
The model is based on two main ideas. First, that while conventional
wage—price models determine the rates of inflation in the controlled and
uncontrolled sectors, the parameters of the models may differ between the
two sectors. Second, that controls are not strictly a qualitative phenomenon,
being either 'on' or 'off', but rather have a quantitative aspect that has
heretofore been ignored. Specifically, the fraction of all prices controlled
varied from month to month and can, in principle, be observed.
8See, for example, Darby (1976) and Feige and Pearce (1976).8 AS.Blinderand WJ.Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price le'el
5.1. The price equation
In order to capture more accurately the timing of the shifts from one
phase of controls to the next, and also to give more observations during the
period of controls, monthly rather than quarterly data were used. However,
there is a limited amount of information in the 32 monthly observations on
the controlled economy, which in turn limits the number of parameters that
can realistically be estimated with these data.
Our basic measure of inflation is the rate of change of the CPI exclusive of
food and energy prices (ir7); we make no attempt here to explain the
behavior of food and energy prices. For the period without controls, our
model of inflation is quite conventional:
(1)
where
4 =the deviation of the growth rate of productivity from its trend,
w =the rate of change of trend unit labor costs (i.e., money wages deflated
by trend productivity levels),
m =therate of change of raw materials prices,
D =an indicator of product-market demand pressures, for which two
different measures were tried,
C =aterm for post-controls 'catch up' inflation, to be explained below,
=awhite noise disturbance term.
This can be thought of as a standard 'markup' equation.
When controls are in effect, an essentially identical equation is assumed to
apply to the uncontrolled sector (sector 1):
+A+
(2)
while an analogous equation with different parameters is assumed to apply inAS. Blinder and WJ. Newton,The 1971—1974 controlsprogram and the price level 9
thecontrolled sector (sector 2):
1=(c0+a0)+(1 +ai)A,+($+b)w1_
+ (q5+ f)m1_+ >(y+c)D,_+e21. (3)
Notice that two sets of identifying assumptions are made: (a) the existence
of controls does not alter the parameters of the equation for the uncontrolled
sector, and (b) w1,m1, and D1 are all the same in the two sectors. While
these assumptions can be questioned, it is hard to see what we can do
without them. A full wage—price model cannot be estimated from 32 monthly
observations.
Since the left-hand side variables in (2) and (3) are unobserved, we need to
link the two equations via the following identity:
ir7 =)ir+ (1 —2)x',=r, +1(ir1 —irr1), (4)
where ,isthe relative importance of the controlled sector. Using (4), (2) and





where e1 is white noise if e1, and e2, are. (Possible contemporaneous
correlation between e11 and e21 thus becomes irrelevant.)
5.2.Thespecfication of catch up inflation
To make (5) operational, we need a specification of the catch up term, C1,
and this is not easy to do in a theoretically satisfying way. What we expect
to happen is something like the following. Industry i gets decontrolled in
9Thatthere is no catch upterm in eq. (3) is definitional since every industry shifts from the
controlled sectorinto theuncontrolledsectorwhenit isreleased fromcontrols.10 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
month t, and at this time has a current price which is g percent below its
equilibrium price. Call g the disequilibrium gap. During the next R months
we expect super-normal inflation rates for this industry as it 'catches up'. If a
set of distributed lag coefficients, v (where j=t—t=number of months
elapsed since decontrol), shows the time pattern by which industry i returns
to its equilibrium price, the additional catch up inflation attributable to
industry i would be: rg1v in month t+j (j=O,lR),where r1 is the
relative importance of industry i. Now in fact we cannot really identify which
industries were decontrolled in which months, nor can we hope to estimate
separate disequilibrium gaps and lag patterns by industry. It seems that the
best we can do is to invoke the heroic assumptions that (a) all industries
catch up with the same distributed lag pattern: v0,v1vR; and (b) all
industries have the same disequilibrium gap, g, on the date they are
decontrolled. The latter is, in fact, an implicit theory of the behavior of the




where is the fraction (relative importance) of the CPI that is
decontrolled in month t, and g can be identified by the restriction that the v's
sum to unity.
5.3. Controlled relative importance, ,
Thistime series was constructed from fragmentary information in various
publications of the Cost of Living Council (COLC), supplemented by
interpolation and some guesswork. Table 1 shows the series, and the
following paragraphs explain how it was constructed.
Table I
Relative importance of controlled prices, A.
Month 1971 1972 1973 1974
January 0 0.818 0.477 0.426
February 0 0.813 0.477 0.426
March 0 0.808 0.477 0.280
April 0 0.802 0.477 0.121
May 0 0.722 0.477 0
June 0 0.698 0.699 0
July 0 0.673 0.912 0
August 0.456 0.649 0.669 0
September 0.912 0.624 0.426 0
October 0.912 0.600 0.426 0
November 0.904 0.576 0.426 0
December 0.845 0.551 0.426 0AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 11
According to COLC's first quarterly report,'° the first freeze covered 91.2
percent of the CPI. Since it began on August 15, 1971, we entered half of this
amount for August, and the full amount for September and October." The
same document reported that 81.8 percent of the CPI was controlled on
December 31, 1971. Since most of the 9.4 percent drop incoverage came
right after the freeze ended on November 15, we guessed at the numbers for
November and December as shown in the table.
A controlled relative importance of 80.2 percent on March 31, 1972was
reported in ESPQR (January—March 1972), so this was recorded for April
1972 and February and March were simply interpolated. The small firm
exemption occurred in May 1972. While the COLC offered no estimate of
the fraction of the CPI that was thereby decontrolled, we made aguess of 8
percent based on its report that 13 percent of wages were decontrolled by
this action (ESPQR, July—September 1972, p. 4). Then for the period May—
December 1972, we simply extrapolated the decontrol rate that had been
observed for Phase II between November 1971 and April 1972.
All the remaining observations came from a COLCpress release (see
ESPQR, January—May 1974) which reported the following values for A:
January 1, 1973 0.477
June 1, 1973 0.426
September 10,1973 0.426
March 1, 1974 0.280
April 1, 1974 0.242
April 18, 1974 0.121
The remainder of table 1 was filled out from these numbers and from the
assumptions that (a) Freeze II, which included half of June 1973, and half of
August 1973, controlled the same fraction of the CPI as did Phase I; (b)
nothing was decontrolled between January 1, 1973 and June 1, 1973.
From the constructed ).,series,the ô, series was created, with one
exception, by the following definition:
=A11— if
5=0 if
10U.S. Cost of Living Council, Economic Stabilization Program Quarterly Report,Covering
the Period August 15 through December 31, 1971. Henceforth these documents are referred toas
'ESPQR' with the appropriate dates.
'1The BLS notes in its publications that the CPI applies to the month as a whole, not toany specific date.12 AS. Blinder andWJ. Newton, The1971—1974controlsprogramand the price level
Had there been only one freeze, this definition would have produced a series
of positive (or zero) numbers which sum to 0.912. But Freeze II increased 2
temporarily from 0.477 to 0.912. In principle one would like to specify a
second catch up from some new disequilibrium gap caused by the second
freeze. This, however, is undoubtedly too much to ask of the limited amount
of data, so the actual5, equals. — ),only if 2,-forall
=1,2This means that the catch up from the first freeze was assumed to
continue during the second freeze, and that the second freeze (which lasted
only two months) created no new disequilibrium gap of its own.
5.4. Estimation results
The distributed lags in eq. (5) were estimated by the Almon lag technique,
after some searching over alternative lag lengths for n, q, m, and R. For
wages, materials prices, and demand, a third-degree polynomial with no
endpoint constraints was adopted. (There was no experimentation with this
choice.) On estimation, materials prices surprisingly turned out to be totally
insignificant, and hence were dropped from the equation.
To conserve on parameters, the lag coefficients in the catch up term were
at first assumed to follow a quadratic constrained to zero at the far end. We
expected to find a lag distribution that rose to a peak and then declined
because the COLC often exacted pledges from newly-decontrolled industries
that they would exercise restraint in raising prices at first. However, on
estimation, this quadratic turned out to be almost exactly linear, so a linear
form was substituted.
The productivity deviation variable, z1, was originally entered in
distributed lag form. However, preliminary estimates made it apparent that
only the contemporaneous value mattered, so the lags were dropped.
Similarly, the interaction term, Azl, which would indicate any differential
effects of productivity deviations under controls, proved insignificant and was
dropped from the regression.
Choices of aggregate demand variables are severely circumscribed when
monthly data are required. We tried two alternative measures: the logarithm
of the unemployment rate, and the residuals from a regression of the
logarithm of real personal income on time (henceforth, personal income
deviations'). More will be said about the choice between these two variables
presently.
Finally, eq. (5) as written contains many parameters pertaining only to the
controlled sector (all the terms involving the variable 2). Not surprisingly,
given that ).iszero in most quarters of the sample, there was fierce
multicollinearity among these variables; so further identifying restrictions
were needed before estimation could proceed. These were:A.S. Blinder andWJ.Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 13
(i) b =0controls did not alter the pass through of wages into prices;
(ii) c =0controls did not alter the effect of aggregate demand on prices.
Of these, (i) accords well with the intent of the controls program, but (ii) is a
regrettable restriction forced upon us by the weakness of the data. It is well
known that the effect of aggregate demand on prices in equations of this type
is relatively weak and difficult to estimate. Asking the data to yield two
different sets of distributed lag estimates was to ask far more than the data
could deliver.12
With all these simplifications, the equation actually estimated was
= +a0,++ -j
+ yD1+ g(1 — v(51_+e,. (6)
When eq. (6) was estimated by ordinary least squares using monthly data
from January 1961 through December 1977 and the log unemployment rate
(log U1) for D1, the results were as follows:13
ir7= —0.0065—0.00223., —0.112A, +0.819w
(0.0018) (0.00044) (0.061)(0.061)
—0.00263log U + 0.0877(1 —
(0.00057) (0.0123) (7)
R2 =0.768,D—W= 2.05,S.E.R. =0.00141,n =204months,
mean of dependent variable =0.0035.
The reported coefficients of w, log U, and (5 are actually the sums of
distributed lag coefficients, where the longest lags were 34, 11, and 8 months
respectively. Lag lengths were chosen to minimize the sum of squared
residuals.
'2Because the cj were set to zero, the model implies that the marginal effects of controls did
not depend on the state of aggregate demand. Implausibly large estimates of c were obtained
when this assumption was relaxed. Nonetheless, simulations based on this equation led to
estimated effects of controls that were similar to those reported belOw.
'3Standard errors are in parentheses. The data were seasonally unadjusted. Eleven monthly
dummy variables were included in the regression, but not shown in eq. (7).14 A.S. Blinderand WJ.Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
The corresponding equation when personal income deviations (P1) were






R2 =0.763,D—W= 2.07,S.E.R. =0.00142.
Maximum lag lengths in this equation were 39 for wages, 29 for personal
income deviations, and 7 for the catch up.14
As the contemporaneous feedback of prices on wages within a single
month is quite trivial, and since there was not even a hint of autocorrelation
in the residuals, it did not seem worthwhile to use econometric techniques
more sophisticated than OLS. The fits of the equations are about the same,
and are remarkably good given that the left-hand side variable is a monthly
inflation ratean extremely noisy series.
The estimated effects of controls in the two models are similar, though
certainly not identical. The coefficients ofimply that a full controls
program=1)something we never hadwould have reduced the
annual inflation rate by about 2.6 or 3.0 percentage points, depending on
which equation we choose. For a more typical value of ) like 0.6, the implied
reductions in the annual inflation rate would be 1.6 or 1.8 percentage points.
Continued over a period of 32 months, such a program would lower the
price level by about 4.2 or 4.7 percent. However, this crude calculation is not
enough to estimate the effects of controls because (a) some catch up begins
as soon as the first industry gets decontrolled (which happened in November
1971), and (b) lower inflation rates lead to lower wage settlements, which in
turn lead to lower inflation, and so on in a typical wage—price spiral. For
both these reasons, a full wage—price model is needed to appraise the effects
of controls. Results obtained with such a model are presented in the next
section.
The two equations are a little farther apart when it comes to estimating
the amount of catch up inflation. Under the assumption that the v sum to
unity, eq. (7) implies that the typical disequilibrium gap existing when an
industry was decontrolled was 8.8 .Eq.(8) estimates the gap to have been
only 6.2 0/s.(Theestimated length of time it took to rectify this gap was
almost the same in the two models.) Thus, on balance, it is clear that eq. (7)
t4lndividual lag coefficients for both equations are available on request.AS. Blinder and Wi. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls programandthe pricelevel 15
(with unemployment) gives a more pessimistic view of controls than does eq.
(8) (with personal income deviations).15
While the aforementioned coefficients are of primary concern in this study,
the others are worth a brief m€ntion. The coefficient of the short-run
deviation of productivity from trend is negative as expected and significant in
both regressions. Not surprisingly, it is smaller in the equation using log U,
since the unemployment rate presumably captures the short-run labor
hoarding from which these short-run productivity deviations partly derive.
The sum of the lag coefficients on trend unit labor costs (and also the
shape of the lag distribution) differs between the two equations. In eq. (7),
this sum is close to, but significantly different from, the 1.0 value that is often
associated with the natural rate. In eq. (8), this sum is only 0.67, which is
puzzlingly low.16
The estimated effects of aggregate demand on prices, while small, were
certainly not negligible. In eq. (7), an increase in the unemployment rate
from 5% to 6wouldeventually lower the annual inflation rate by 0.57
percentage points, which seems in line with other estimates. In eq. (8), where
personal income deviations are used to measure demand, a sustained 2%
increase of real personal income above trendwhich corresponds roughly
to a 1 percentage point drop in the unemployment rate —isestimated to
add 0.44 percentage points to the annual inflation rate.
5.5. Simulation results
Before we can estimate the effects of controls on the price level, it is
necessary to model the feedback of prices into wages. Taking a cue from
other investigators who had failed to turn up any direct effect of controls on
the wage equation, we estimated the following conventional Phillips curve:
=0.0070+ 0.965ir —0.00082log U, (9)
(0.0047) (0.174) (0.00148)
R2=0.64, D—W=2.28, S.E.=0.00388,
where W is the rate of change of money wages and it is the rate of change of
the all-items CPI. The coefficients of inflation and unemployment are sums
of coefficients of distributed lags of lengths 42 and 4 months, respectively.
'5While we did not Constrain the estimates in any way, there is good consistency betweenthe
coefficients of A and 5. The coefficient of A implies that the 'disequilibrium gap' for an industry
that was controlled for the full 32 months would have been 7.3% or 8.3%, depending on which
equation is used.
'61n this context, it is worth repeating that materials prices were tried, but obtained a
coefficient near zero. For those interested in such things, we report that the rate of growth of
money (measured by M2) made no independent contribution to either equation.16 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
The sum of the inflation coefficients is close to unity, and there is remarkably
little sensitivity of wage inflation to unemployment.
The distributed lag on past inflation rates in eq. (9) can be given two
alternative interpretations. On the one hand, it can measure the catch up
process of wages to past (unanticipated) inflation, in which case actual
inilation rates are being used as proxies for unanticipated inflation rates. On
the other hand, it can be considered a proxy for future anticipated inflation
rates. The latter interpretation seems to be more popular, and raises the
following question: If, as some proponents of controls claim, the controls
program had a direct effect on inflationary expectations, would not the
distributed lag proxy be systematically biased during the controls program?
Were this true, it seems to us, a controls variable should 'sop up' this
systematic misestimation of expected inflation when added to eq. (9). This
proved not to be the case.
A word on identification should also be entered. The price equation is
identified from the wage equation by the omission of lagged prices from the
former and of lagged wages, the productivity term, and the controls variables
from the latter. (In addition, one version of the price equation uses a
different demand variable than the wage equation.) These identifying
restrictions were tested. Neither productivity deviations nor ) entered (9)
significantly.17 Lagged prices were insignificant when added to eq. (8), but
did contribute marginally to eq. (7).18Laggedwages were significant (F
=4.1) when added to eq. (9), but produced implausible parameter
estimates.'9





p1 =thetrend rate of increase of productivity applicable to month t (see data
appendix for a description),
r7= therelative importance of non-food non-energy items in the CPI,
=therate of inflation of the CPI food component,
=therate of inflation of the CPI energy component,
=therelative importance of food items in the CPI,
=therelative importance of energy items in the CPI.
'7A 'catch up' variable similar to that used in the price equation was significant. However,
since no direct depressing effect of controls on 14' was found, we judged this correlation to be
spurious.
18The F ratio was 3.2, which is significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level.
'9The sum of the price coefficients was 4.1 while the sum of the wage coefficients was —2.8.A.S. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 17
Tables2 and 3 display the results obtained in a 77-month dynamic
simulation of two versions of this four-equation model, one using (7) and the
other using (8). The simulation used actual wage and price data up to July
1971, and predicted values thereafter, with no error correction. Not shown in
either table, but worthy of note, is the fact that both models track history
extremely well when controls are 'on', and are almost precisely on track
when the simulation ends in December 1977. The tables also include, in
parentheses beneath each estimate, approximate standard errors derived from
a Monte Carlo procedure.2°
Table2
Effectsof controls on the non-food, non-energy Consumer Price Index, 1971—
1975, based on Model 1 (unemployment rate), in percent.











































































































20The estimated effects of controls in each month are very complicated non-linear functions of
all the parameters of the model. Their sampling distributions are unknown. We estimated
standard errors as follows. First, we made 100 drawings from the (known) joint normal
distribution of the regression coefficients. For each drawing, a 77-quarter simulation of the type
described in the text was run. From these 100 runs, a mean and a standard deviation of the
estimated effects of controls was calculated for each month. The standard deviations appear in
tables 2 and 3.18 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
Table 3
Effects of controls on the non-food, non-energy Consumer Price Index, 197 1—
1975, based on Model 2 (personal income deviations), in percent.
Month 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
January —1.180 —2.616 —4.066 —2.242



































































































The two models tell somewhat different stories about the effects of
controls. As expected, Model 2, with personal income deviations as the
demand variable, is more optimistic about controls than is Model 1, which
uses the unemployment rate.
According to Model 1, controls reduced the non-food non-energy inflation
rate by about 1 percentage points during their first year, and then had only
a small effect on inflation until Freeze II (June—August 1973) began. This
freeze had a noticeable effect, however, and by February 1974, when the
maximum effect of controls apparently was felt, non-food non-energy prices
were about 3.1 percent lower than they would have been without controls.
At this point, extra catch up inflation in the uncontrolled sector began
overwhelming whatever effects controls were still having in the controlled
sector, and by October 1974 the price level was just about where it would
have been had controls never been put in place. According to this model,A.S. BlinderandWJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 19
catchup was particularly severe between March and September of 1974, and
there was virtually no permanent effect on the price level.
Model 2 agrees with this assessment in broad outlines, but differs
substantially in its details. According to this model (which measures demand
by personal income deviations), controls chopped about 2 points off the
inflation rate between August 1971 and July 1972, and pushed prices down
almost another percent between July 1972 and June 1973. Freeze II again
shows up clearly, and the ultimate downward deflection of the price level —
which,once again, comes in February 1974 —is4.2%. Up to this point,
while Model 2 is more optimistic about controls, the predictions of the two
models are within one standard deviation of each other.
More disagreement emerges in the catch up period. While both agree that
catch up started in March 1974, and was strongest between March and
August, Model 2 estimates the catch up to have been far from complete.
According to this model, the price level in November 1974 remained 2.2
percent below what it would have been in the absence of controls, and was
permanently lowered by about 2.4 percent. These last two estimates differ
from those of Model 1 by about 1.7 standard deviations.
Our conclusions about the catch up would therefore be firmer if one
model clearly dominated the other. However, such is not the case. In terms
of within-sample fit, Model 1 does slightly better. A variety of genuine post-
sample prediction tests that we ran resulted in a draw: each model
outperformed the other in some periods. In terms of 'reasonableness' of the
coefficients, Model 1 seems to have a more sensible wage elasticity of the
price level than does Model 2. On balance, Model 1 perhaps has a small
edge, but the margin is slight.
6. Conclusions
Armed with the estimates from section 5, let us now address the questions
asked in the opening section: by how much did controls hold down prices
while they were in effect? how much catch up inflation was there when
controls were lifted? to what extent can decontrol account for the
acceleration and deceleration of inflation in 1973—1975?
As we have already seen, the two models differ modestly in their answer to
the first question. In both cases, the maximal estimated effect of controls on
the price level came in February 1974. But in Model 1 (based on the
unemployment rate) this was estimated to have been —3.1 percent while in
Model 2 (based on personal income deviations) the estimate was —4.2
percent.
Both models agree that there was catch up inflation alter February 1974,
though they differ on the amount. .Focusing on the period from February to
October 1974, Model 1 estimates that catch up carried the price level up 3
percent while Model 2 makes this only 2 percent.20 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
These disagreements, while not trivial, are perhaps not that great.
Reasonably good agreement is also reached on the third question, as table 4
illustrates. The first two lines summarize the behavior of the CPI stripped of
food and energy prices —thevariable called it"inthe model. Examination
of this series shows a clearly defined period of 'double digit' inflation lasting
from February to October 1974, with much lower inflation rates both before
and after. Because this period of peak inflation was 8 months long, 'pre-peak'
and 'post-peak' periods of 8 months' duration were chosen for symmetry. As
can be seen in line 2, the non-food non-energy inflation rate accelerated
almost 7 percentage points in early 1974 and decelerated almost 5 percentage
points in late 1974. How much of this roller-coaster pattern of inflation can
be traced to the controls?
Table 4
Acceleration and deceleration of inflation, 1973—1975.
Pre-peak period Peak period Post-peak period











Contribution of wage—price controls according to Model 1
(3) To inflation
rate —1.34% +5.12% +0.28%
(4) To acceleration!
deceleration +6.46% —4.84%
Contribution of wage—price controls according to Model 2
(5) To inflation
rate —1.82% +2.17% —0.20%
(6) To acceleration!
deceleration + 3.99% —2.37%
Lines (3)—(6) give the answers according to the two models. Lines (3) and
(5) come directly from the estimated effects of controls on the price level in
tables 2 and 3 by converting the estimated effects on price levels into effects
on the annual inflation rate. These lines merely repeat the differences between
the two models that we have already noted. Lines (4) and (6) indicate how
much of the acceleration and deceleration of inflation each model 'blames' on
the controls. The conclusion from Model 1 is that almost all of theAS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 21
movement in non-food non-energy inflation during this two-year period was
a result of the controls. Model 2, with its incomplete catch up, blames only
about half of the acceleration and deceleration on controls.
A more detailed look at the period from June 1971 to June 1975 as a
whole reveals that, while the models disagree moderately on the effects of
controls on the meaninflationrate, they agree very well that controls added
substantially to the varianceofthe inflation rate. Table 5 displays this
conclusion. It is constructed by dividing the period June 1971—June 1975 into
eight half-years and computing for each the annual rate of inflation (a) that
actually occurred in non-food non-energy prices, (b) that would have
occurred in the absence of controls according to Model 1, (c) that would
have occurred in the absence of controls according to Model 2. The
differences in the means simply repeat what we have already seen. But the
differences in the standard deviations are strikingly large in both models.
Table 5






(a) Actual data 5.91 °,, 3.70?..,
With no controls according to:
(b) Model 1 5.63 ? 1.44
(c) Model 2 6.38 ' 1.95 °'
For non-food non-energy CPI.
bftased on annual rates of inflation over 8 half-year periods.
The models agree that controls at least doubled the standard deviation of
the inflation rate over the four-year period as a whole. If, as we suspect may
be the case, the most severe social costs from inflation are attached to its




Therates of change of the CPI (;) and its non-food non-energy
components (t7) were computed from official BLS data on the seasonally
unadjustedlevels of these series. Seasonal adjustment was accomplished by
adding 11 monthly dummies to the estimated equations.22 AS. Blinder and WJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level
Materials prices
Materials prices were measured by the Producer Price Index for crude
materials for further processing.
Wages
The rate of change of money wages was measured using the BLS's series
on average hourly earnings of production or non-supervisory workers on
manufacturing payrolls, seasonally unadjusted and corrected for overtime
and interindustry shifts. Monthly changes were used with no attempt to
'smooth' the data.
Productivity
Quarterly BLS data on the growth rate of output per hour in non-





R2 =0.046,D—W= 1.96, S.E. =0.00866,
where G1 is the quarterly growth rate of productivity, D11 is a dummy which
is one beginning in 1966:1, and D2, is a dummy which is one beginning in
1973 :2.21 Thefitted values from this regression were used to generate the
'trend productivity' factor (called p1 in the model) by phasing in the two
discrete drops in the productivity trend linearly over 12-month periods
centered on 1966:1 and 1973:2. The differences G1—p, constituted the
variable LI1 used in the regressions. Both p1 and LI1 as just defined are
quarterly series. They were converted to monthly series by linear
interpolation.
Personal income deviations
The personal income deviations series was created by deflating personal
income by the Consumer Price Index, and then fitting the following
regression to monthly data from January 1957 through December 1978:
log (real personal income) =0.201 + 0.00331 time,
(0.003) (0.00002)
R2=0.988, D—W=0.03.
21These break points were chosen to minimize the sum of squared residuals in the regression.
It is interesting that they are nonetheless statistically insignificant.A.S. BlinderandWJ. Newton, The 1971—1974 controls program and the price level 23
Unemployment
The unemployment rate was measured by the BLS's unemployment rate
for all civilian workers.
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